An Unfulfilled Promise:  The Need for Charter School Reform in New Jersey by Barbosa, Jr., Franklin
FRANKLIN BARBOSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015 3:49 PM 
 
359 
AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE:  THE NEED FOR CHARTER 
SCHOOL REFORM IN NEW JERSEY 
 
Franklin Barbosa, Jr. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 360 
II.  THE CURRENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY’S CHARTER 
  SCHOOL LAWS: THE BASICS ............................................... 363 
A. The Charter Contract ......................................................... 363 
B. Financing a Charter School ............................................... 364 
C.  Charter School Admissions and Enrollment Policy .......... 365 
III.  SENATE BILL 2319 .................................................................. 367 
A.  Context .............................................................................. 367 
B.  The Text of Senate Bill 2319 ............................................. 368 
i. Charter School Authorization Board ........................... 369 
ii. Public Input in the Charter School Application Review 
Process ......................................................................... 370 
iii. Mandatory Certified Public Lottery ............................. 371 
IV.  CRITICISMS OF SENATE BILL 2319 .................................... 371 
A. Local Binding Control Over Charter Schools ................... 372 
B. Requiring that Charter School Demographics Mirror the 
Sending District ................................................................. 374 
V.  LEGISLATIVE SUGGESTIONS .............................................. 375 
A. No Binding Local Control ................................................. 376 
B. No “Mirroring” Requirement ............................................ 381 
C. Funding Parity is Necessary for Charter Success .............. 384 
VI.  CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 386 
 
  
 
 Special thanks to Senator M. Teresa Ruiz and Professor Julia Sass Rubin for taking 
time out of their busy schedules to provide interviews and help us better understand 
the intricacies surrounding the charter school reform debate. 
FRANKLIN BARBOSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:49 PM 
360 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 39:2 
 
“The philosophy of the school room in one generation will be the 
philosophy of government in the next.”1 
-Abraham Lincoln 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 11, 1996, New Jersey Governor Christine Todd 
Whitman, acting before a joint session of the State Legislature, signed the 
Charter School Program Act of 1995 (“the Act”) into law.2  The symbolic 
nature of this event was evident from the surrounding circumstances, as 
it was the only State of the State Address in New Jersey history dedicated 
solely to one topic: education reform.3  Prior to Governor Whitman 
signing the bill into law, no charter schools existed in New Jersey.  The 
Act, which made New Jersey the twentieth state to authorize the creation 
of charter schools, was largely a response to the universal outrage 
accompanying the publication of A Nation at Risk, a 1983 report from 
President Ronald Reagan’s National Commission on Excellence in 
Education.4  The Commission’s report highlighted the “rising tide of 
mediocrity” in American education and ultimately, sparked state efforts 
to revitalize American public schools.5 
“Alternatives to traditional public schooling based on choice and 
autonomy became critical to the revitalization efforts.”6  New Jersey’s 
 
1 Education Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/a/abrahamlin133687.html?src=t_education (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
2 Robert J. Martin, Article, Rigid Rules for Charter Schools: New Jersey as a Case Study, 
236 RUTGERS L.J. 439, 445 (2005). 
3 Id. at 525 (citing Joseph V. Doria Jr., The Function of Political Capital in the New Jersey 
Legislature’s Traditional Role in the Formulation of Educational Policy: A Participation 
Observation Illustrated by the Charter School Act of 1995 (2000) (unpublished dissertation, 
Columbia University) (on file with author)). 
4 Jason M. Barr, Alan R. Sadnovnik, & Louisa Visconti, Charter Schools and Urban 
Education Improvement: A Comparison of Newark’s District and Charter Schools, 38 URB. 
REV. 291, 291 (2006); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: 
THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html. 
5 NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), available at http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html; 
see also Barr et. al, supra note 4, at 291. 
6 See Barr et. al, supra note 4, at 292; see also ARNOLD SHOBER, THE DEMOCRATIC 
DILEMMA OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: OUT OF MANY, ONE? 196 (2012) (stating that the charter 
school concept was a “middle-of-the-road response” to the insufficiencies of traditional public 
schools and the “constitutional threats” of a voucher program). 
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Charter School Program Act mirrors the aforementioned efforts.  For 
example, a brief glimpse at the introductory sections of the Act indicates 
that the legislature intended to “assist in promoting comprehensive 
educational reform by providing a mechanism for the implementation of 
a variety of educational approaches which may not be available in the 
traditional public school classroom,” and increase the “educational 
choices available” for students and parents.7  In other words, the 
Legislature designed charter schools to be public school alternatives, to 
provide school choice to students and parents, and encouraged charter 
schools to experiment with new forms and philosophies of education. 
While the public greeted the Act’s passage with some optimism, the 
Act’s initial results were anything but promising.  Within the first six 
years of the Act’s enactment, the New Jersey Department of Education 
(“NJDOE”) listed sixteen charter schools as “closures,” including several 
charter schools that were approved, but never opened.8  Nevertheless, by 
the end of the 2004–2005 academic year, over fifty charter schools were 
in operation.9 
According to the NJDOE, as of the 2012–2013 academic year, 
approximately eighty-seven charter schools operate in the State.10  
Arguably, these statistics demonstrate success in the growth and 
proliferation of charter schools in New Jersey.  Not all academics have 
viewed this propagation positively, however.  Some education scholars 
view this growth as undesirable and harmful to the interests of students 
and society as a whole.  Scholars like Bruce Baker, Julia Sass Rubin, and 
Mark Weber have pointed to numerous structural and accountability 
issues within the New Jersey charter laws and the charter school 
 
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-2 (West 2014) (“The Legislature finds and declares that the 
establishment of charter schools as part of this State's program of public education can assist 
in promoting comprehensive educational reform by providing a mechanism for the 
implementation of a variety of educational approaches which may not be available in the 
traditional public school classroom.  Specifically, charter schools offer the potential to 
improve pupil learning; increase for students and parents the educational choices available 
when selecting the learning environment which they feel may be the most appropriate; 
encourage the use of different and innovative learning methods; establish a new form of 
accountability for schools; require the measurement of learning outcomes; make the school 
the unit for educational improvement; and establish new professional opportunities for 
teachers.”). 
8 See Barr et. al, supra note 4, at 293. 
9 Id. 
10 N.J. Dep’t of Educ., New Jersey Public Schools Fact Sheet, 
http://www.state.nj.us/education/data/fact.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2014) (reporting facts for 
the 2012-13 academic year). 
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movement as a whole.11 
These scholars, through their concerns, have identified one troubling 
aspect of the current state of the New Jersey charter laws; there has not 
been a major, substantive amendment to the Act since its creation.12  
“[T]he body of law pertaining to charter schools in New Jersey has 
evolved in several stages since 1996, but at no point has there been a 
systemic revision.”13  During the twenty-year period since the passage of 
the Act, there have been numerous attempts to pass sweeping charter 
reform legislation without success.  Most recently, State Senator M. 
Teresa Ruiz (D-Newark) introduced Senate Bill 2319, a charter reform 
bill viewed by at least one commentator as the “best-chance version of a 
new charter-school law.”14  Nevertheless, in both the Senator’s interviews 
and public comments to media outlets, Senator Ruiz has asserted that this 
bill is the “starting point” towards the ultimate goal of meaningful charter 
reform.15 
In order to inform the conversation surrounding Senate Bill 2319, 
this Note will describe the bill, compare its provisions to another recently 
proposed bill that failed to garner enough support in the New Jersey 
Assembly, and posit a scheme that will promote meaningful charter 
reform that serves the best interest of students while adhering to the Act’s 
 
11 See Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, Assoc. Professor, Rutgers Univ., 
Edward J. Bloustein Sch. of Planning & Pub. Policy (Sept. 26, 2014) (Professor Rubin 
lamented the lack of local control over charter school creation/expansion, the lack of a 
requirement that charter school demographics mirror those of the sending districts, weak 
language banning for-profit charter schools, and insufficient accountability and transparency); 
Mark Weber, Opinion: Was It Something We Said About Garden State’s Charter Schools, NJ 
SPOTLIGHT (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/11/13/opinion-was-it-
something-we-said-about-nj-s-charter-schools/ (citing to a recent study that he authored along 
with Julia Sass Rubin, which points to racial and ethnic disparities between charter school 
populations and their district counterparts). 
12 Adrienne Lu, New Jersey Should Update Charter School Law, Committee Told, 
PHILLY.COM (Jan. 25, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-01-
25/news/27047567_1_charter-schools-public-school-schools-greater-flexibility (“New 
Jersey’s 15-year-old charter school law should be updated to improve accountability and 
transparency”). 
13 Martin, supra note 2, at 451. 
14 John Mooney, Long-Discussed Charter-School Reform Bill Finally Gets Legislative 
Hearing, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/10/16/long-
discussed-charter-reform-bill-finally-gets-hearing/. 
15 Telephone Interview with Senator Teresa Ruiz (D-Newark), N.J. State Senator (Dec. 
1, 2014); Mooney, Long-Discussed Charter-School Reform Bill Finally Gets Legislative 
Hearing, supra note 14 (Senator Ruiz referred to Senate Bill 2319 as the “start of the 
conversation”). 
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goal of promoting school choice.  Part II of this Note provides a basic 
description of charter schools and how they operate, and analyzes the 
current state of the charter school laws in New Jersey.  Part III describes, 
in detail, Senate Bill 2319’s provisions and how they materially alter the 
current charter school laws.  Part IV examines the most prominent 
criticisms of Senate Bill 2319 as articulated by Professor Julia Sass Rubin 
of Rutgers University and determines whether those criticisms are 
harmonious with the purpose of the Act.  Finally, Part V suggests three 
legislative suggestions to be considered in relation to Senate Bill 2319, 
and the general effort to provide for a more efficient charter school 
assessment and approval process while upholding the original purpose of 
the Act; namely, school choice. 
These legislative suggestions are: prohibit local school boards and 
populations from providing binding input, require an in-depth analysis of 
charter school demographics as compared to their local neighborhoods, 
feeders, and applicant pools prior to any discussions of lottery-system 
reform, and enact a provision that charter schools receive funding 
equivalent to their district counterparts. 
 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF NEW JERSEY’S CHARTER SCHOOL 
LAWS: THE BASICS 
A. The Charter Contract 
“A charter school is an independently run public school granted 
greater flexibility in its operations, in return for greater accountability for 
performance.”16  A “charter” is a contract governing the performance of a 
charter school, and the Commissioner of Education (“Commissioner”) is 
the individual who grants the charter.17  A charter describes the school’s 
“mission, program, goals, students served, methods of assessment, and 
ways to measure success.”18  In other words, the Commissioner and an 
individual charter school enter into a performance-based contractual 
relationship.  Initially the contract is for a four-year period and may be 
renewed for a five-year period.19  Should a charter school fail to meet the 
objectives and obligations laid out in the charter, the Commissioner has 
 
16 Frequently Asked Questions About Public, Charter Schools, UNCOMMON SCHOOLS, 
http://www.uncommonschools.org/faq-what-is-charter-school (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). 
17 N.J. Dep’t of Educ., What is a Charter School?, 
http://www.nj.gov/education/chartsch/about.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2015); see also Barr et. 
al, supra note 4, at 292. 
18 Barr et. al, supra note 4, at 292. 
19 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-17 (West 2014). 
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discretion to place a charter under a probationary status or revoke the 
charter and shut down the school.20 
In order to assess a charter’s school compliance with the charter 
contract, the Act requires the Commissioner to “annually assess whether 
each charter school is meeting the goals of its charter.”21  To expedite the 
Commissioner’s annual assessment, charter schools are required to 
submit an annual report to the Commissioner, the local school board, and 
the county superintendent.22  The annual report must contain data 
assessing the achievement of school goals, the efficiency of internal 
governance, performance on state tests and assessments, the level of 
parental involvement, as well as a financial plan.23  In essence, charter 
schools are required to submit a deluge of information to the 
Commissioner for assessment purposes. 
Typically, when it is evident to the Commissioner that a charter 
school is not in compliance with its charter contract, the Commissioner 
will place the school on a probationary status in order to allow for the 
implementation of a remedial plan.24  Based on the success of the 
probationary remedial plan, the Commissioner will decide whether to 
revoke the charter and shut down the school, extend the probationary 
period, or remove the charter school from probation and allow it to 
continue operations.25 
 
B. Financing a Charter School 
Charter schools are publically funded and are not allowed to charge 
tuition.26  Instead, the burden of financing charter school operations falls 
directly on the local school district.  Specifically, the Act requires the 
local school district to pay a charter school “90% of the sum of the budget 
year equalization aid per pupil and the prebudget year general fund tax 
 
20 Id. (“The commissioner may revoke a school’s charter if the school has not fulfilled 
any condition imposed by the commissioner in connection with the granting of the charter or 
if the school has violated any provision of its charter. The commissioner may place a school 
on probationary status to allow the implementation of a remedial plan after which, if the plan 
is unsuccessful, the charter may be summarily revoked.”). 
21 Id. § 18A:36A-16(a). 
22 Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-16(b). 
23 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-2.2(a)(1)–(b)(3) (West 2015). 
24 Id.; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-2.4(a) (2015). 
25 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-2.4(a)(4)–(6). 
26 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-8(a) (“A charter school shall not charge tuition to students 
who reside in the district.”). 
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levy per pupil inflated by the CPI rate most recent to the calculation.”27  
Additionally, “the school district of residence shall pay directly to the 
charter school the security categorical aid attributable to the student and 
a percentage of the district’s special education categorical aid equal to the 
percentage of the district’s special education students enrolled in the 
charter school and, if applicable, 100% of preschool education aid.”28  In 
simpler terms, charter schools are supposed to receive about 90 percent 
of the per pupil funding that a district school would receive for a student.  
Other than the antecedent provisions, all charter schools must adhere to 
New Jersey Annotated Code section 6A:23A, which consists of 
regulations governing the budgeting procedures and financial 
accountability standards of all public schools.29 
On a related note, charter schools, when contracting with private 
parties, must comply with the New Jersey Public School Contract Law.30  
Like most other public contract laws, the New Jersey Public School 
Contract Law requires a school to award most contracts for goods, 
services, and capital improvements to the “lowest responsible bidder.”31 
 
C. Charter School Admissions and Enrollment Policy 
In terms of student enrollment, the Act requires that charter schools 
be “open to all students on a space available basis.”32  Enrollment 
preference is given to students residing in the public school district where 
the charter is situated or in the charter school’s region of residence if so 
designated.33  Should the number of applications for admission to a charter 
school exceed the number of seats available, the charter school must 
select students using a “random selection process,” usually in the form of 
a public lottery.34  Furthermore, a charter school’s admission policy, “to 
the maximum extent possible,” must pursue the enrollment of a “cross-
section” of the local community’s school-age population, “including 
 
27 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-12. 
28 Id. 
29 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-4.13. 
30 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:18A-1; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-3.1(c). 
31 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:18A-1. 
32 Id. § 18A:36A-7. 
33 Id. § 18A:36A-8(a); N.J. ADMIN CODE § 6A:11-1.2 ("District of residence" means the 
school district in which a charter school facility is physically located; if a charter school is 
approved with a region of residence comprised of contiguous school districts, that region is 
the charter school's district of residence). 
34 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-8(a); N.J. ADMIN CODE § 6A:11-1.2 
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racial and academic factors.”35  Adhering to federal law, the statute does 
not impose quota requirements.  Instead, the statute places the burden on 
the individual charter school to obtain diversity.36  Regulations pertaining 
to the Act require the Commissioner to annually appraise the “segregative 
effect that the loss of the students may have on its district of residence.”37 
Furthermore, charter schools cannot discriminate against applicants 
based on their intellectual ability, athletic ability, mental or physical 
handicap, proficiency of the English language, or any other 
discriminatory measure that would be considered illegal if employed by 
a public district school.38  For students with limited English language 
proficiency, a charter school must provide “all required courses and 
support services to meet the Core Curriculum Content Standards.”39  In 
relation to students with educational disabilities, New Jersey regulations 
require that charter schools offer free education to students with learning 
disabilities in compliance with the federal Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”).40  Nevertheless, a charter school may limit their 
admissions policies to specific grade levels or concentrations, such as 
math or the arts.41 
Finally, it is important to note that a charter school may expel 
students.42  A charter school may expel a student based on criteria 
contained within the school charter that is consistent with state law 
dictating how public schools may expel students, and the Commissioner 
must ultimately approve it.43 
 
 
 
 
 
35 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-8(e). 
36 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (collectively prohibiting the use of quotas 
in admissions policies); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also 
Martin, supra note 2, at 470–71. 
37 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-2.1(j); Martin, supra note 2, at 471. 
38 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-7. 
39 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:11-4.7. 
40 Id. § 6A:11-4.8. 
41 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-7. 
42 Id. § 18A:36A-9. 
43 Id. 
FRANKLIN BARBOSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:49 PM 
2015] AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE 367 
III. SENATE BILL 2319 
A. Context 
As mentioned in the introductory section of this Note, numerous 
charter reform bills have been introduced in the New Jersey State 
Assembly, but have ultimately failed.44  Most notably, in May of 2014, 
Assemblyman Troy Singleton (D-Burlington) introduced a charter 
reform bill that aimed to satisfy proponents and critics of charter school 
expansion.45  Assemblyman Singleton referred to his bill as a 
“compromise.”46  For example, the bill provided that thirty percent of the 
criteria for state approval of a new charter school would be the local 
school board’s vote.47  Additionally, Assemblyman Singleton’s bill would 
have provided state funding for facilities and given charter schools first 
rights on vacated district school buildings.48  Finally, the bill would have 
created a nine-person charter school authorization board that would have 
made recommendations to the Commissioner, who would retain final say 
over charter school openings.49 
Despite the accommodating nature of Assemblyman Singleton’s 
bill, it inspired neither charter proponents nor critics.  On the one hand, 
the New Jersey Charter Schools Association (“NJCSA”), a non-profit 
member organization devoted to representing the charter school 
community, supported the effort Assemblyman Singleton expended, but 
ultimately, questioned the wisdom of local input and the retention of final 
charter school approvals with the Commissioner rather than with the 
proposed nine-member authorization board.50  On the other hand, Save 
Our Schools NJ, which has advocated for a local approval requirement to 
be added to the current charter law, did not support the bill because it 
lacked “binding” local input in the charter school approval process.51  
 
44 John Mooney, Fine Print: Charter-School Bill Chock Full of Details -- Some New, 
Some Familiar, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/10/20/fine-print-charter-school-bill-chock-full-of-
details-some-new-some-familiar/.  
45 John Mooney, Reform Bill Could Reshape Landscape for Charter-School Approvals, 
NJ SPOTLIGHT (May 23, 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/05/22/reform-bill-
could-reshape-landscape-for-charter-school-approvals/. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 Mooney, Reform Bill Could Reshape Landscape for Charter-School Approvals, supra 
note 45. 
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Ultimately, Assemblyman Singleton’s bill failed to muster enough 
support in the Assembly and has been stuck in committee since January 
2014.52 
It was in the aftermath of Assemblyman Singleton’s failed charter 
reform attempt that State Senator M. Teresa Ruiz (D-Newark) proposed 
her own charter reform bill, Senate Bill 2319, a bill that she had been 
working on even prior to the introduction of Assemblyman Singleton’s 
proposed bill.53  At least one commentator views Senate Bill 2319 as the 
“best-chance version of a new charter-school law.”54  Senator Ruiz was 
adamant in clarifying that the bill is a “work in progress” and not in its 
final form.55  In Senator Ruiz’s opinion, the lack of any meaningful, 
substantive reform of New Jersey’s charter laws is indicative of 
legislative inattention to the Act.56  Senator Ruiz believes that student 
needs have evolved since the passage of the Act, and will continue to 
change over time; therefore, it is important to revisit the provisions laid 
out in the Act, to ensure that student needs are addressed.57  Thus, Senator 
Ruiz introduced Senate Bill 2319 in order to take a significant step 
towards satisfying the needs of current and future students.58 
B. The Text of Senate Bill 2319 
Senator Ruiz’s proposed bill contains some provisions found in 
earlier charter reform bills proposed in the Assembly, and it contains 
some new provisions as well.59  Also, it makes a number of substantive 
changes to the Act.  Namely, the bill creates a charter school authorization 
board that shares charter authorization powers with the Commissioner; 
requires that a school district selling or leasing a school facility must grant 
 
52 NJ STATE LEGISLATURE, BILLS 2014-2015, 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillView.asp?BillNumber=A436.  
53 John Mooney, Assemblyman Unveils Much-Anticipated Final Draft of Charter 
Legislation, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/01/21/assemblyman-unveils-much-anticipated-
charter-bill/.  
54 Mooney, Long-Discussed Charter-School Reform Bill Finally Gets Legislative 
Hearing, supra note 14. 
55 Telephone Interview with Senator Teresa Ruiz, supra note 15. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 John Mooney, Fine Print: Charter-School Bill Chock Full of Details -- Some New, 
Some Familiar, supra note 44 (referring to the new authorization board and “request for 
proposal process,” while simultaneously pointing out familiar provisions requiring charters to 
meet charter performance goals and provide access to students with disabilities.). 
FRANKLIN BARBOSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:49 PM 
2015] AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE 369 
right of first refusal to a charter school; requires the use of a certified 
public lottery where the number of applicants exceeds the number of 
available spaces at a charter school; and, as part of the application review 
process, provides for two public meetings in any district where a 
proposed charter will be located.60 
 
i. Charter School Authorization Board 
The most fundamental, structural change to the Act relates to the 
State’s ability to enter into a charter contract with a charter school.  Senate 
Bill 2319 proposes the creation of a charter school authorization board 
that will share charter authorization and review powers with the 
Commissioner.  Specifically, the language of Senate Bill 2319 states, 
“[t]he bill establishes the charter school authorizing board that will, in 
addition to the Commissioner of Education, serve as a charter school 
authorizer.”61 
The proposed board would be comprised of nine members.62  The 
Governor would appoint three members, various other government 
leaders would appoint four members, and the President of the State Board 
of Education and the Executive Director of the New Jersey School Boards 
Association would serve as ex officio members.63  To avoid any sort of 
political maneuvering, the bill mandates that no more than four members 
of the board shall come from the same political party.64  Additionally, to 
ensure that the charter school board would exercise expertise in the 
charter school approval process, the bill requires that authorizers have 
experience in “public and nonprofit governance, management, finance, 
public school leadership, assessment, curriculum, instruction, and public 
school law.”65 
Under Senate Bill 2319, while the authorization board would 
exercise great power, the State Board of Education would still provide 
“oversight of the charter school authorizing board, and would have the 
authority to suspend the charter school authorizing board’s activities . . . 
if the State board determines that the charter school authorizing board is 
 
60 S.B. 2319, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014). 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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deficient in performing its duties.”66  To make sure that the authorization 
board can adequately operate, the bill requires the appropriation of 
$250,000 to fund it.67 
 
ii. Public Input in the Charter School Application Review 
Process 
Senate Bill 2319 adds a new section directly impacting a charter 
authorizer’s review of a charter school application.  First, pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the bill provides for the promulgation of 
regulations, which enumerate nationally followed practices and criteria 
for charter school authorizations.68  Under Senate Bill 2319, a charter 
school authorizer would be bound to follow those regulations when 
assessing a charter school application.69 
Moreover, Senate Bill 2319 provides for two additional steps in the 
application process: an interview and public meetings.70  First, the bill 
mandates an “in-person interview with each charter school applicant.”71  
The bill provides no guidance as to which individuals an authorizer would 
be meeting, but presumably, a charter school applicant would send a 
designated representative or their board of trustees.72  Second, and most 
notably, Senate Bill 2319 provides for “two public meetings” where “the 
residents of the school district that would be served by the charter school 
would have an opportunity to provide input on the application.”73  Under 
the original Act, there was no provision granting any sort of public input 
in the charter school approval process.  Much like Assemblyman 
Singleton’s proposed legislation, the imposition of two public meetings 
in Senate Bill 2319 is likely an attempt to appease those commentators 
calling for local input in the charter school approval process. 
 
 
66 S.B. 2319, 216th Leg., Rg. Sess. (N.J. 2014). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id.  
72 S.B. 2319, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014). 
73 Id.; N.J. ADMIN CODE § 6A:11-1.2 (West  2015) ("District of residence" means the 
school district in which a charter school facility is physically located; if a charter school is 
approved with a region of residence comprised of contiguous school districts, that region is 
the charter school's district of residence). 
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iii. Mandatory Certified Public Lottery 
The Act provides that a charter school must employ a “random 
selection process,” whenever the number of applicants seeking admission 
to a charter school exceeds the number of space available.74  At first 
glance, the phrase “random selection process” seems like a nebulous term 
that provides charter schools with great latitude in choosing a random 
selection process.  Senator Ruiz’s bill eliminates that amorphous 
characteristic.  Instead, Senate Bill 2319 mandates the use of a “certified 
public lottery” where the number of applicants exceeds the space 
available, essentially codifying a common practice in the charter school 
industry.75  Additionally, in the spirit of transparency and oversight, 
Senate Bill 2319 requires a charter school to include lottery procedures 
in their charter school application.76  Charter school authorizers are then 
responsible for developing procedures for publicizing and certifying a 
public lottery conducted by a charter school.77 
 
IV. CRITICISMS OF SENATE BILL 2319 
On September 26, 2014, Julia Sass Rubin, an Associate Professor at 
the Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers 
University and co-founder and volunteer member of Save our Schools 
NJ, a grassroots, volunteer education advocacy organization, provided an 
interview.  Rubin has critiqued the current charter school law as needing 
greater local control components, more transparency, and a means to 
address an apparent demographic mismatch between charter and district 
schools. 
Rubin’s concerns and criticisms of the current charter laws and 
Senate Bill 2319 fall under four umbrella categories: (1) the lack of 
binding local control over charter school “establishment, expansion, or 
closure;” (2) the lack of a requirement that charter school demographics 
“mirror those of the sending districts;” (3) the lack of stronger language 
prohibiting “for-profit charter schools;” and (4) insufficient charter 
school accountability and transparency.78  This Note will address the local 
control and demographics concerns in detail, while reserving the “for-
profit” charter school issue and the accountability and transparency issues 
 
74 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-8(a) (West 2014). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11. 
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for another article. 
 
A. Local Binding Control Over Charter Schools 
Rubin believes that Senate Bill 2319’s creation of a charter school 
authorization board “diminishes” local control over charter school 
creation, expansion, and closure.79  Rubin points out that the creation of a 
charter school authorization board is the product of model legislation put 
forth by interest groups like the National Alliance of Charter School 
Authorizers (NACSA), an advocacy organization dedicated to crafting 
and publishing charter school evaluation and authorization standards, and 
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a politically 
conservative lobbying organization with which NACSA contracted to 
pass the model legislation.80  In essence, Rubin argues that Senate Bill 
2319 allows pro-charter interest groups to dictate charter school policy 
rather than allowing local communities or the State Board of Education 
to do so.81 
Furthermore, Rubin takes issue with the “political” nature of the 
proposed charter school authorization board.82  As mentioned previously, 
Senate Bill 2319 provides for a nine-person authorization board with its 
members appointed by various governmental actors, such as the 
Governor, President of the Senate, and Assembly Speaker among others.83  
Additionally, the Commissioner and the NJDOE oversee this board.  
Rubin argues that the NJDOE does not have the resources or capacity to 
oversee this new entity and that it is a board consisting of political 
appointees lacking accountability to the local community.84  In other 
words, Rubin believes that this “political but diffused” board removes 
responsibility for charter approvals from the Governor and 
Commissioner and places it in a board that is much harder to hold 
accountable.85 
 
 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. (citing James Osborne, In New Jersey, Nonprofit at Center of Education Conflict, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://mobile.philly.com/news/?wss=%2Fphilly%2Fnews%2Fhomepage%2F&id=13745666
3&deliver=iphone&c=y&viewAll=y#more.). 
82 Id. 
83 S.B. 2319, 216th Leg., Rg. Sess. (N.J. 2014). 
84 Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11. 
85 Id. 
FRANKLIN BARBOSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:49 PM 
2015] AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE 373 
As such, Rubin believes that Ruiz’s proposed bill does not reflect 
the needs and desires of local communities and does not provide for any 
form of local control over charter schools.   Rubin does not feel that the 
requirement of two public community meetings proposed in Senate Bill 
2319 constituted community control, as the bills did not include any 
requirement that charter authorizers adhere to the community wishes 
expressed at those meetings.86  She argued that Senate Bill 2319 “gives 
local communities no ability to influence a charter school’s creation, 
expansion or closure.”87  Rubin also pointed out that NACSA has openly 
stated that the intent of the authorizing board is to override local control.88 
Instead, Rubin recommends that a local vote be conducted for every 
charter school approval, expansion, or closure.89  Rubin is not alone in her 
call for a local vote requirement.  In an April 2011 opinion piece, 
Assemblyman Patrick Diegnan (D-Middlesex), Chair of the Assembly 
Education Committee, opined that charter schools should have to “prove 
their worth to the public” before they can open and spend taxpayer 
money.90  To justify this opinion, Assemblyman Diegnan argued that 
“[o]ur democracy relies on giving the community a voice,” and local 
control is the “right thing to do.”91  Rubin has cited similar democratic 
principles in support of the call for a local vote.92 
If a direct vote was not possible, Rubin felt that a vote by a 
popularly-elected school board would be an acceptable alternative.93  
Rubin emphasized that an appointed school board in a state-controlled 
district, such as exists in Camden, is not accountable to the local 
community and would not be an acceptable alternative to a direct popular 
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. (citing NACSA Policy Brief – Creating Independent Chartering Boards, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF CHARTER SCHOOL AUTHORIZERS, 
http://www.qualitycharters.org/assets/files/Documents/Policy/Creating%20Independent%20
Chartering%20Boards.pdf (“In states where only school districts serve as authorizers, some 
communities are likely to be overseen by districts that are hostile to all charter applications, 
which effectively stops all chartering.”)).  
89 Id. 
90 Patrick J. Diegnan, Jr., Let New Jersey Voters Make Decision on Charter Schools, 
NEWJERSEYNEWSROOM.COM (Apr. 14, 2011), 
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/commentary/let-voters-make-decision-on-charter-
schools.   
91 Id.  
92 Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11. 
93 Id. 
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vote or vote by a popularly-elected, locally-controlled school board.94 
 
B. Requiring that Charter School Demographics Mirror the 
Sending District 
Rubin also argues that Senate Bill 2319 does not sufficiently address 
the apparent demographic disparity between charter schools and school 
districts, as documented by Rutgers Professor Bruce Baker and others.95  
A month after the interview, Rubin, and Rutgers doctoral student, Mark 
Weber, published a research report that compared the demographic 
composition of New Jersey charter and district schools.96 
Weber and Rubin’s study looked at charter and district school 
demographics across the state of New Jersey, paying particular attention 
to seven urban communities.97  The method of the study compared the 
overall charter school demographics in each community to those of the 
sending districts.  Weber and Rubin concluded that charter schools “serve 
a population that is very different demographically than that of their host 
districts.”98  Namely, Weber and Rubin found that charter schools 
educated “a significantly smaller percentage of economically 
disadvantaged students” than did their host districts; charter schools only 
educate “one-sixth the percentage of Limited English Proficient (LEP) 
students;” and a smaller percentage of special needs students.99  
Furthermore, the study asserts that special needs students at charter 
schools have less expensive classifications than the students at district 
schools.  The study also found that charter schools educate fewer males, 
a smaller percentage of Hispanic students, and a higher percentage of 
Black students than do their host districts.100 
To remedy the ills noted in the study, Weber and Rubin make a 
number of policy recommendations.  First, they recommend that the 
NJDOE conduct a universal lottery process for all charter schools, 
 
94 Id. 
95 Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11. 
96 MARK WEBER & JULIA SASS RUBIN, NEW JERSEY CHARTER SCHOOLS: A DATA-DRIVEN 
VIEW, PART I (2014), available at http://www.saveourschoolsnj.org/save/corefiles/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/NJ-Charter-School-Report_10.29.2014.pdf.  
97 Id. (The seven urban communities analyzed by the study were Camden, Hoboken, 
Jersey City, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, and Trenton). 
98 Id. at 4. 
99 Id. (Rubin and Weber used Free Lunch and Free or Reduced Price Lunch students as a 
marker of economic disadvantage). 
100 Id. (reporting 62% v. 40%). 
FRANKLIN BARBOSA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:49 PM 
2015] AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE 375 
consisting of a single application deadline in order to promote 
transparency and make it “easier for economically disadvantaged and 
Limited English Proficient Families to apply.”101  Moreover, Weber and 
Rubin promote the use of a “weighted lottery” in order to increase the 
admission of higher percentages of economically disadvantaged or LEP 
students.102  Finally, Weber and Rubin propose tying “demographic 
parity” to a charter school’s funding.103  Under the proposed parity 
scheme, for example, a charter school that fails to match 90 percent of 
their host district’s demographic would receive a “lower reimbursement 
rate per student.”104  Pursuant to the results and suggestions included in 
the study, Rubin criticizes Senate Bill 2319 for its failure to ensure charter 
school populations reflect the district of origin population.105 
 
V. LEGISLATIVE SUGGESTIONS 
The purpose of this Note is to assess the charter reform topic by 
interviewing prominent individuals in the field of education reform and 
policy.  The interview with Senator Ruiz was meant to reveal the thought-
process and motivations behind the crafting of Senate Bill 2319 from the 
perspective of a policy-maker.  The purpose of interviewing Julia Sass 
Rubin was to understand the perspective of an education scholar who 
possesses reservations about the current state of the charter school law 
and Senate Bill 2319.  Based on the information gleaned from both 
Senator Ruiz and Professor Rubin, this Note endeavored to research the 
strengths and weaknesses of the current charter school laws, Senate Bill 
2319, and the concerns put forth by Rubin. 
The research has resulted in the following legislative suggestions to 
be considered in further negotiations surrounding Senate Bill 2319: (1) 
do not provide for binding local control over the creation, expansion, or 
closure of charter schools; (2) do not create any legislation requiring a 
weighted lottery or other mechanism forcing charter schools to mirror the 
demographics of the local district; and (3) enact a provision that charter 
schools receive funding equivalent to their district counterparts. 
 
101 Id. at 5. 
102 WEBER & RUBIN, supra note 96 (explaining a weighted lottery would involve creating 
more lottery entries for targeted communities). 
103 Id. at 6. 
104 Id. 
105 Telephone interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11. 
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A. No Binding Local Control 
Despite the importance of voting in a democratic society, any 
imposition of local binding control over charter schools would further 
empower entrenched political groups to dictate charter school policy 
rather than allowing a local population’s voice to be heard.  Additionally, 
education reform, in general, is a complex topic requiring expertise in 
order to come to an informed opinion, and local populations, regardless 
of educational attainment or socio-economic status, do not possess 
expertise in relation to education policy.  Therefore, control over charter 
school creation, expansion, and closure should remain with the NJDOE, 
the Commissioner, and the charter school authorization board proposed 
by Senate Bill 2319 because they possess education policy expertise and 
are sufficiently isolated from political pressures. 
The NJDOE is an administrative agency possessing expertise in the 
field of education. Since the passage of the Act, the NJDOE, specifically 
the Commissioner, has been vested with ultimate discretion over the 
creation of charter schools.106  The reason for vesting this discretion in the 
NJDOE and the Commissioner is because administrative agencies and 
their agents are valued for their “expertise, efficiency and bureaucratic 
neutrality.”107  Agencies are staffed with individuals possessing 
experience in the areas regulated by the agency, and “agencies and their 
staff develop experience over time that allows them to make more 
informed policy decisions.”108  In terms of efficiency, agencies can “act 
more quickly using streamlined procedures.”109  Finally, in relation to 
bureaucratic neutrality, one fundamental assumption about 
administrative agencies is that “sound policy judgments are best made 
through the neutral application of scientific knowledge.”110  
Administrative agencies are “somewhat removed from political 
pressure.”111 
While these virtues are present in administrative agencies, they are 
not present in the local population or school board.  No method exists to 
ensure that local voters have expertise when it comes to education policy 
issues.  Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court has explicitly 
 
106 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-17 (West 2014). 
107 ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION 
IN LEGAL CONTEXT 6 (2d ed. 2014). 
108 Id. at 6. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 7. 
111 Id. 
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recognized the value of administrative expertise in the sphere of 
education.  For example, in In re Proposed Quest Academy Charter 
School of Montclair Founders Group, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
found that the Commissioner did not act in an “arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable” manner in relying upon local community input and her 
own expertise in rejecting a proposed charter school in Montclair.112  
Specifically, Justice LaVecchia noted that courts have “recognized the 
value that administrative expertise can play in the rendering of a sound 
administrative decision.”113 
Additionally, local popular votes are not necessarily efficient.  
Elections cost money and take time.  They must be scheduled in advance 
to provide the local citizenry with proper notice of the election.  On the 
other hand, agencies can respond to issues more quickly and effectively 
due to their streamlined procedures.114  Finally, a local electorate is not 
neutral.  By their very nature, people will sometimes vote based on their 
political beliefs rather than based on what benefits them. 
Nevertheless, individuals who support local binding control over 
charter school-related issues will claim that local schools boards are more 
accountable to the voters and better reflect the will of the people as 
opposed to a politically appointed commissioner.  However, there is a 
multitude of information that demonstrates that local school boards are 
not politically neutral, and thus their accountability to local populations 
can be called into question.  The best way to understand the lack of local 
school board neutrality is to look at the monopolization of power over 
local school boards by teachers unions.  Historically, teachers’ unions, 
despite public statements of support, tend to view charters as “threats to 
public schools and teacher jobs” and have even fought their creation and 
expansion.115  Nevertheless, for the purpose of this Note, union sentiments 
are secondary to teacher union mobilization and power over local election 
processes. 
A number of factors impact the influence of teachers’ unions over 
local school boards: low voter turnout, high turnout among teachers, and 
massive amounts of campaign contributions to local school board 
candidates.  First of all, local school board elections have “relatively low 
 
112 216 N.J. 370 (2013). 
113 Id. at 389. 
114 Id. 
115 T.M. MOE, SPECIAL INTEREST: TEACHERS UNIONS AND AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
103 (2011).  
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visibility” and low voter turnout, and this renders the elections 
particularly susceptible to vested interests.116  For example, when local 
school board elections are held on the same day as a national or statewide 
election, voter turnout averages about 44 percent; whereas when a local 
school board election is held as a special election, turnout only averages 
about 26 percent.117  Furthermore, nearly 96 percent of school board seats 
are elected through these low-turnout elections.118 
Additionally, as voters, teachers tend to turnout in large numbers in 
local school board elections, especially as compared to nonteacher 
turnout.  In 2006, T.M. Moe orchestrated a study in Southern California 
and found that teachers were two to seven times more likely to vote in 
school board elections than were their nonteacher peers.119  Therefore, 
high teacher turnout combined with low non-teacher turnout gives 
teachers’ unions inordinate amounts of influence over elections. 
Furthermore, teachers’ unions tend to spend money to influence 
local elections.  T.M. Moe, in a 2003 survey, found that unions were an 
important source of campaign contributions in local school board 
elections and that influence increased based on the size of the district.120  
For example, in districts containing less than 5,000 students, unions 
contributed to candidates in 22 percent of districts.121  However, in 
districts with more than 25,000 students, teachers’ unions contributed to 
candidates in 94 percent of districts.122  Some may doubt the ability of 
teachers’ unions to raise enough money to make substantial financial 
contributions.  However, a report by New Jersey’s Election Finance 
Committee found that the New Jersey Education Association (“NJEA”), 
the largest teachers’ union in the state, has spent over $57 million on 
lobbying in the past 15 years.123  This demonstrates that teachers’ unions 
 
116 T.M. MOE, TEACHERS’ UNIONS AND SCHOOL BOARD POLITICS, IN BESIEGED: SCHOOL 
BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS (William G. Howell, ed., 2005); Heather 
Rose & Jon Sonstelie, School Board Politics, School District Size, and the Bargaining Power 
of Teachers’ Unions, 67 J. URB. ECON. 438, 439 (2010). 
117 Rose & Sonstelie, supra note 116, at 439. 
118 Id. 
119 T.M. MOE, UNION POWER AND THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN, IN COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING IN EDUCATION: NEGOTIATING CHANGE IN TODAY’S SCHOOLS (Jane Hannaway & 
Andrew J. Rotherham eds., 2006).   
120 Rose & Sonstelie, supra note 116, at 439 (citing T.M. MOE, TEACHERS’ UNIONS AND 
SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS (2003)). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 John Mooney, NJEA Spent Nearly $60M on Campaigns and Lobbying in Past 15 
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possess the financial wherewithal to influence local and state elections. 
All of these factors have made control over local school boards the 
primary source of a teachers’ union’s political power.124  However, this 
power has come at the expense of underprivileged communities in large 
school districts.   
The political disadvantage for homeowners is particularly acute in large districts 
because the effort required to influence an election in a large district is rather 
cumbersome.  Teachers’ unions are able to execute the effort required to sway 
elections in large districts because ‘union membership grows with district size 
and the funds that a union can raise from its members increase with its 
membership.’
125
 
Thus, teachers’ unions will be most powerful in larger districts, where the 
voices of minorities and underprivileged communities are largely 
situated. 
However, it is important to note that teachers’ unions are not the 
only organizations that lobby local school boards and exercise influence 
over local elections.  A study by T.T. Holyoke that surveyed charter 
schools operating in Arizona, Michigan, and Pennsylvania found that a 
majority of charter school organizations admitted to lobbying in at least 
one governmental venue.126  Most notably, K12, Inc., a charter school 
operator focusing on online learning and operating in New Jersey, spent 
over $600,000 on lobbying efforts between 2007 and 2011.127  Education 
Reform Now, a non-profit education reform think tank and advocacy 
organization, outspent the New York teachers’ unions for lobbying 
expenses in 2010.128  As a result, requiring that charter schools be 
approved through local popular elections or local school board elections 
will result in outcomes reflecting the desires of powerful interest groups 
and the disenfranchisement of minorities and underprivileged 
 
years, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/09/10/njea-
spent-nearly-60m-on-campaigns-and-lobbying-in-past-15-years/. 
124 Katherine O. Strunk & Jason A. Grissom, Do Strong Unions Shape District Policies?: 
Collective Bargaining, Teacher Contract Restrictiveness, and the Political Power of 
Teachers’ Unions, 32 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 389, 391 (2010) (citing T.M. 
Moe, Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (2006)).  
125 Rose & Sonstelie, supra note 116, at 439. 
126 JEFFREY R. HENIG, THE END OF EXCEPTIONALISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE 
CHANGING POLITICS OF SCHOOL REFORM 138 (2013) (citing T.T. Holyoke, Choosing 
Battlegrounds: Interest Group Lobbying Across Multiple Venues, 56 POL. RES. Q. 325, 325–
36 (2003)). 
127 Id. (citing Stephanie Saul, Profits and Questions at Online Charter Schools, N.Y. 
TIMES (DEC. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/education/online-schools-score-
better-on-wall-street-than-in-classrooms.html?_r=2&pagewanted&).  
128 Id. 
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populations. 
Additionally, it is important to address Rubin’s assertion that 
NACSA has openly stated that the intent of the authorizing board is to 
override local control.129  A plain reading of the language found in the 
document does not lend itself to the conclusion that NACSA intentionally 
wants to nullify local control.  Instead, NACSA seems to merely express 
a fear that some school boards acting as charter school authorizers may 
have “conflicts of interest” that prevent them from fairly discharging their 
duties as authorizers.130  Logically, as explained in the preceding 
paragraphs, if a school board is effectively under the influence of 
powerful interest groups that oppose the creation of charter schools, this 
will end chartering. 
Finally, it is important to note that these suggestions are not meant 
to paint teachers’ unions or charter organizations as boogeymen.  Instead, 
these arguments demonstrate that local popular votes and local school 
board votes are susceptible to influence and have arguably been 
monopolized by teachers’ unions.  Thus, these elections do not 
necessarily result in the outcome local populations and disenfranchised 
communities desire.  Instead, these types of elections require local 
populations to put faith in the magnanimity of interest groups like 
teachers’ unions, which is not always the best option for a local 
community.131 
 Because a local vote requirement may serve to only promote the 
interests of powerful interests groups, ultimately, student and parent 
school choice would be hindered.  On the other hand, Senate Bill 2319’s 
provisions for local input are sufficient to allow a charter school 
authorizer to glean the local community’s sentiments while also 
preventing powerful interest groups from holding too much influence 
over charter school approvals, expansions or closures.  Thus, Senate 
Bill’s lack of a binding local vote requirement, and preservation of some 
local input limits the influence of powerful interests groups and thus 
secures the choice available to students and parents.  This result advances 
the original purpose of the Act. 
 
129 Telephone Interview with Julia Sass Rubin, supra note 11. 
130 NAT’L ASS’N OF CHARTER SCHOOL AUTHORIZERS, supra note 88, at 2  
131 Rose & Sonstelie, supra note 116, at 441 (finding that in the context of collective 
bargaining agreements, unions would be “more willing than voters to sacrifice nonteacher 
expenditures or the number of teachers to secure an increase in salaries”); Strunk & Grissom, 
supra note 124 (finding that contracts in districts with strong unions “allow school district 
administrators less flexibility than do contracts in districts with weaker, less active unions.”). 
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B. No “Mirroring” Requirement 
As mentioned earlier, Mark Weber and Julia Sass Rubin published 
a study examining the demographics of charter schools as compared to 
the sending districts.132  Based on this methodology, Weber and Rubin 
concluded that charter schools were not educating the same populations 
as compared to the populations the local district schools were educating.133  
Mark Weber has referred to this method of comparison as the “simplest 
and most illuminating way” to assess charter school populations. 
Weber is correct in stating that the methodology he employed is 
“simplest,” but incorrect in stating that it is the “most illuminating.”  
Essentially, Weber and Rubin’s study fails to consider the diversity of 
neighborhoods located within large school districts and to fully 
appreciate the landscape of public schools in a district.  Weber and 
Rubin’s study assessed charter school demographics across the state, 
paying particular attention to seven urban communities: Camden, 
Hoboken, Jersey City, Newark, Paterson, Plainfield, and Trenton.134  
These communities can be further divided into various neighborhoods or 
wards.  Some of these neighborhoods and wards are economically diverse 
as compared to other wards in the same communities and from the district 
as a whole. 
Newark provides the best example of ward-to-ward economic 
diversity.  The city of Newark is divided into five wards: North, South, 
Central, East and West.135  A 2013 study conducted by the Rutgers 
University Cornwall Center for Metropolitan Studies, in collaboration 
with the Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, highlights the 
economic diversity existing among the wards.136  The study found that the 
rate of poverty in Newark varies by ward.137  For example, nearly one-
third of South and Central ward residents are in poverty, whereas the East 
ward’s rate of poverty is only 18 percent.138  As a result, it is likely that 
 
132 WEBER & RUBIN, supra note 96 (finding discrepancies in charter school education of 
Free or Reduced Price Lunch students, LEP students, and special education students).  
133 Id.  
134 Id. 
135 Newark City Ward Boundaries (2000), RUTGERS UNIV., 
http://policy.rutgers.edu/cupr/rcopc/data_atlas/6.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
136 LIZ MAHN ET. AL, BARRIERS TO UPWARD MOBILITY: A SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF NEWARK 
AND THE CHALLENGES TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 13 (Rutgers Univ. 2013), available at 
http://policy.rutgers.edu/academics/projects/practicums/BarrierstoUpwardMobility.pdf. 
137 Id. at 19. 
138 Id. 
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charter schools that cannot provide busing will not be able to bus poor 
students from other wards, and charters facing a mirroring requirement 
may be forced to ignore poverty-stricken students in their own 
neighborhoods.  Additionally, as pointed out by Carlos Perez in his 
testimony before the Assembly Education Committee in 2013, a 
mirroring requirement is unworkable because at the time of the lottery 
process, charter schools only know whether an applicant is “age 
appropriate and resides in the district,” and are not aware of the students’ 
socio-economic status.139  Therefore, a poverty-driven mirroring 
requirement would not be feasible, especially in large-urban communities 
The use of district averages also fails to appreciate different kinds of 
public schools that already exist in some districts.  In a recent op-ed, Rick 
Pressler, interim president of the New Jersey Charter Schools 
Association, highlighted that there are “at least six different types of 
public school options” currently available in New Jersey.140  Included 
among those six options are: charter schools, open-enrollment district 
schools, selective public magnet schools, Renaissance schools (Urban 
Hope Act), choice school districts, and selective county technical 
vocational schools.141  Despite the fact that selective magnet schools and 
vocational technical schools are allowed to cherry-pick top students, and 
despite the fact that traditional public schools may not mirror a district’s 
demographics, Weber and Rubin prefer imposing a mirroring 
requirement solely on charter schools.  These realities affect a charter 
school’s applicant pool and the types of students they are capable of 
admitting. 
Additionally, it is important to note that Rubin and Weber’s study 
bifurcates those students categorized as Free Lunch and Reduced Price 
lunch in order to gain a deeper understanding of the population of 
students educated by charter schools.142  Weber and Rubin suggest that 
charter schools do not educate as many Free Lunch students, and thus 
economically disadvantaged students, as their district counterparts, and 
 
139 N.J. Charter Schs. Ass’n, Testimony by Carlos Perez Before the Assembly Education 
Committee on A4177, http://njcharters.org/index.php/start-a-charter-school/the-
application/doc_details/169-1330evaluationofsba?tmpl=component (last visited Feb. 15, 
2014). 
140 Rick Pressler, Op-Ed: Charter Schools are Best Way to Bring Equity to Education in 
New Jersey, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/12/16/op-
ed-charter-schools-are-the-best-way-to-bring-equity-to-education-in-nj/. 
141 Id. 
142 WEBER & RUBIN, supra note 96 at 27–32 
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this affects the positivity of charter school test and performance results.143  
The authors of the study argue that schools that educate more Reduced 
Price Lunch students than their counterparts have an “edge in producing 
desirable academic outcomes.”144  However, there is one major flaw in the 
authors’ arguments; the questionable assessment utility of free and 
reduced price lunch monikers.  For example, “the need for alternatives 
and supplements is becoming more urgent, as recent federal rule changes 
broaden eligibility for the program,” thus calling into question the 
usefulness of the above mentioned monikers.145  Additionally, a 2010 
study in Educational Researcher found that at least 20 percent of students 
are “misidentified by school meals programs.”146  Statisticians at the 
National Forum for Education Statistics, have become so concerned that 
they have identified three alternative “interconnected aspects of poverty” 
that may be used to create more representative poverty indexes: 
“community-, neighborhood- and school-level socioeconomic status.”147  
Therefore, the accuracy of free and reduced price labels is dubious, may 
exaggerate any perceived demographical disparities within charter school 
population, and may not accurately quantify the poverty faced by New 
Jersey’s students.  As such, Weber and Rubin’s conclusions must be 
taken with a grain of salt. 
In sum, a charter school should not be required to mirror a district’s 
population.  Charter schools are located in different neighborhoods and 
sometimes face different applicant pools and feeder schools.148  Also, the 
statistics and labels used to quantify poverty are questionable.  Imposing 
a mirroring requirement on one sort of public school and not on others is 
inherently unfair.  If a mirroring requirement were to be imposed, should 
not all public schools in a district be required to adhere to that mirroring 
 
143 Id. at 30. 
144 Id.  
145 Sarah D. Sparks, Popular Child-Poverty Measure Gets Another Look: Free-lunch 
Measure Seen As Less Accurate, EDUCATION WEEK (Aug. 20, 2014), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/08/20/01povertymeasures.h34.html.  
146 Id. (citing Michael Harwell & Brandon LeBeau, Student Eligibility for a Free Lunch 
as an SES Measure in Education Research, 39 EDUC. RES. 120, 120–131 (2010)). 
147 Id. (citing NAT’L CNTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, IMPROVING THE MEASURE OF 
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS: A 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION (Nov. 2012), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/researchcenter/Socioeconomic_Factors.pdf. 
148 For a study focusing on charter school demographics as compared to feeder schools 
see CNTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN NEW JERSEY 
(Stanford Univ. 2012), available at 
http://credo.stanford.edu/pdfs/nj_state_report_2012_FINAL11272012.pdf.  
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requirement?  Furthermore, mirroring requirements limit a parent or 
student’s ability to choose which school they would like to attend.  This 
result is at odds with the original purpose of the Act. 
Instead of focusing on a mirroring requirement, scholars who 
believe that charter schools are not adequately serving certain populations 
should come up with legislative solutions that provide for better 
advertising of charter school applications processes and lotteries.  
Additionally, charter schools should only be accused of skimming or 
intentionally cherry-picking skilled students if there is a discrepancy 
between a charter school’s demographics as compared to those of its local 
community and applicant pool.  Thus far, there is no data suggesting that 
is the case. 
 
C. Funding Parity is Necessary for Charter Success 
Notably absent from Senate Bill 2319 is any mention of charter 
school funding parity.  Essentially, Senate Bill 2319 would preserve the 
current scheme posited under the Act, namely that charter schools receive 
90 percent of the per pupil funding received by public district schools.149  
The problem with the current scheme is that charter schools do not always 
receive 90 percent of the per pupil funding that their public district 
counterparts obtain. 
In 2014, JerseyCAN, a non-profit education reform advocacy 
organization, published The 90 Percent Myth, a brief analysis of funding 
inequities between charter schools and their district counterparts.150  In 
their analysis, JerseyCAN explains that charter schools are excluded from 
certain types of aid, namely “adjustment, educational adequacy, school 
choice and transportation aid.”151  As a result, there often exists a “funding 
equity gap between district and charters that ranges from 20 percent to 
29.9 percent.”152  JerseyCAN further postulates that if charter schools 
actually received 90 percent of the per pupil funding that their district 
counterparts received, charters would be entitled to approximately $43 
 
149 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36A-12(b) (West 2014). 
150 JerseyCAN, The 90 Percent Myth: Fixing Funding Inequities for New Jersey Charter 
Schools, http://jerseycan.org/sites/jerseycan.org/files/90%25%20myth.pdf (last visited Feb. 
9, 2015). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. (citing Measuring up to the Model: New Jersey, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. 
CHARTER SCHS., http://www.publiccharters.org/get-the-facts/law-database/states/NJ/ (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2015)).  
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million more in funding.153  According to Gloria-Bonilla Santiago, the 
founder and board chair of Camden’s LEAP Academy University Charter 
School, adjustment aid represents one of the primary sources of funding 
inequity facing charter schools.154  As a result of the funding disparity 
adjustment aid causes, the Camden city school district receives an extra 
$17.6 million dollars in funding for students that have enrolled in charter 
schools and no longer attend district-run schools.155 
Santiago also refers to facilities funding as one of the primary 
sources of funding inequity faced by charter schools.156  In general, New 
Jersey law does not provide charter schools with public facilities or 
facilities funding.157  Therefore, charter schools must use their operational 
funding for the procurement of school facilities, sometimes spending 
$1,418 per student on facilities expenditures.158  As a result of these 
funding disparities, charter schools that want to expand their enrollment 
cannot create adequate space for such an increase.159  This is especially 
concerning considering that over 20,000 students are on various wait-lists 
to enroll in charter schools.160 
Senate Bill 2319 should be amended to include a provision making 
charter schools eligible for adjustment, educational adequacy, school 
choice, transportation, and facilities funding aid.  In other words, if 
charters are paying for their own facilities, providing transportation, or 
afford services similar to those that districts schools are responsible for, 
those charters should be compensated.  The problem with the funding 
disparity between charters and district schools is the apparently inherent 
assumption that charters are “lesser” entities.  There seems to be a popular 
sentiment that charter schools take money away from public schools, and 
 
153 Id. at 2. 
154 Gloria-Bonilla Santiago, Op-Ed: Dollars Don’t Make Sense -- Time to Improve 
Charter School Funding, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Feb. 13, 2015), 
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/15/02/12/op-ed-dollars-don-t-make-sense-time-to-
improve-charter-school-funding/. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. (citing An Analysis of the Charter School Facility Landscape in New Jersey, 
CHARTER SCH. FACILITIES INITIATIVE, 
http://njcharters.org/docs/report_facilitiesanalysis_201301.pdf  (last visited Feb. 13, 2015)). 
159 The 90 Percent Myth: Fixing Funding Inequities for New Jersey Charter Schools, 
supra note 150. 
160 N.J. Charter Sch.s. Ass’n, Charter Schools Continue to Grow Throughout New Jersey, 
http://njcharters.org/index.php/9-news/117-charter-schools-continue-to-grow-throughout-
new-jersey (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
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many charter schools and charter school associations have gone to great 
lengths to dispel that myth.161 
The logic supporting that popular misconception fails to recall that 
public schools and charter schools are public schools.  Students who 
choose to attend charter schools, and therefore divert their per-pupil 
funding to attend charter schools, are simply reallocating public funds to 
another public institution. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Charter school creation and growth has been a controversial topic 
since the inception of the Charter School Program Act of 1995.  Senator 
Teresa Ruiz is one of the state’s most prominent policymakers and Julia 
Sass Rubin is one of the state’s most recognizable scholars, and they were 
kind enough to share their time to advance this discussion.  It is evident 
that both of them share one thing in common; they want what is best for 
students and communities.  For that reason, their hard work should be 
respected immensely.  Nevertheless, this respect should never prevent an 
author from exhibiting utter honesty and forthrightness. 
First, a local binding vote would only serve the interests of powerful 
interests groups, forgo valuable administrative expertise, and further 
disenfranchise underprivileged, minority communities.  Local 
populations simply do not possess the expertise and political neutrality 
necessary to deal with complex issues like charter school management 
and educational methodology.  Furthermore, due to low-voter turnout, 
 
161 California Charter Sch.s. Ass’n, Dispelling Myths About Charter Schools, 
http://www.calcharters.org/understanding/faqs/myths.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2015) (“In 
California, public school funding follows the student, with the funding going to the public 
school the parents choose, whether a charter school or a traditional district school.  When 
charter public schools are funded, there is no overall loss of public school money because 
charter schools are public schools.”); Charter School Misconceptions, CHARTER SCHOOL FOR 
APPLIED TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.csat-k12.org/Page/21 (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (In 
New York State, school districts only contribute about 66% of each charter school students’ 
expenses, meaning that when a student leaves, the remaining 33% of his/her funding stays 
with the home school district.  The charter school gets 66% of the money and 100% of the 
student!”); National Conference of State Legislatures, Charter School Finance (Feb. 2011), 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/charterschoolfinance.pdf (“Defenders of 
traditional public schools are concerned that charter schools are taking money away from 
those schools.  Simply having one less student does not proportionally decrease the burden 
on a district.  It likely still needs the same number of teachers, other staff, the same facilities 
and the same instructional materials.  However, losing students to a charter school or another 
traditional school have the same effects and traditional schools have always had to adjust to  
enrollment changes.”).  
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teachers’ unions exercise an inordinate amount of influence over local 
school board elections and members.  This influence only becomes more 
powerful in larger districts, where underprivileged, minority 
communities are located.  Therefore, placing control over charter schools 
in the hands of a board inveigled by powerful interests would further 
disenfranchise underprivileged populations. 
Second, requiring that charter school demographics mirror those of 
the sending district ignores the racial, ethnic, and economic diversity that 
exists in the neighborhoods and wards of larger cities.  In a study prepared 
by Rutgers University, it is evident that racial and ethnic diversity is 
pronounced across Newark’s wards, thus making it impracticable for 
charter schools to meet any mirroring requirement.  Moreover, a 
mirroring requirement almost certainly would require local charter 
schools to forsake needy populations within their local neighborhoods in 
order to meet artificially imposed mirroring requirements.  Instead, 
scholars should propose ideas that foster better advertising and awareness 
of charter school applications and lotteries. 
Finally, Senate Bill 2319 must address funding disparities between 
charters and their district counterparts.  Charter schools would be able to 
accommodate more students on their ever-growing wait-lists if they could 
receive transportation, adjustment, educational adequacy, and school 
choice aid.  Unfortunately, the funding parity issue is a vestige of an 
inherent assumption that charter schools are inferior or unequal.  Funding 
parity is a step towards removing the inherent assumption of inferiority.  
Only with these provisions can New Jersey adhere to the promises it made 
under the Charter School Program Act of 1995. 
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